English :: Prison Instead of School - Work Instead of Play - Bianet

English :: Prison Instead of School - Work Instead of Play - Bianet

Stone-throwing children: Turkish kids would be traumatized by our story

Stone-throwing children: Turkish kids would be traumatized by our story

Turkse parlementaire verkiezingen en de Koerden: grote partijen wisselen van positie, Koerdische leiders vervolgd

Met minder dan twee weken te gaan voor de parlementaire verkiezingen is de sfeer te snijden in Turkije. De verkiezingskoorts loopt hoog op, vooral in de oostelijke Koerdische gebieden. Sinds februari al lopen politieke protesten steevast uit op grootscheepse gevechten tussen de politie, het leger en pro-Koerdische sympathisanten. Het Turkse leger voerde zijn militaire acties tegen de Koerdische PKK - rebellen op met de dood van meer dan 40 PKK-guerillas als gevolg.

Aan de andere kant van Turkije staat de Koerdische kwestie ook op de verkiezingsagenda. De twee grootste politieke partijen, de AKP van de huidige Eerste Minister Erdogan en de CHP, de sociaal-democratische oppositiepartij, zijn van positie veranderd wat betreft de toekomst van de Koerden. De AKP, die de afgelopen jaren onder druk van de Europese Unie het bestaan van de Koerden en de Koerdische kwestie heeft toegegeven – een historische stap voor Turkije – schakelde in de laatste weken over naar een sterk nationalistisch discours. Premier Erdogan verklaarde in één van zijn verkiezingsrally's zelfs dat de Koerdische kwestie niet langer bestond. Op die manier maakte hij duidelijk dat hij deze verkiezingen niet langer naar de hand van de Koerden dingt, maar naar die van de Turks-nationalisten. De MHP, traditioneel de partij van de extreem-nationalisten, speelt immers een sleutelrol in deze verkiezingen. Als de MHP de kiesdrempel van 10% niet haalt, heeft de AKP naar alle waarschijnlijkheid de meerderheid in het parlement en vrij spel om de grondwet te veranderen.

De CHP aan de andere kant, met zijn Kemalistische achtergrond, steekt in zijn verkiezingsdiscours dit keer duidelijk de hand uit naar de Koerdische kiezers. Toen 12 PKK-guerillas sneuvelden in een gevecht met het leger, respecteerde het CHP-hoofdkwartier in Diyarbakir, de grootste stad van het zuidoosten, de rouwperiode die werd afgekondigd door de pro-Koerdische beweging en sloot hun verkiezingsbureau 'uit respect voor de wil van het volk'. Tijdens een bezoek aan Hakkari, een Koerdische provincie aan de grens met Irak die onder sterke invloed is van de PKK, maakte CHP-leider Kilicdaroglu drie beloften. Ten eerste sprak hij zich uit voor meer autonomie voor de gemeenten naar voorbeeld van het Europese model, een belangrijke eis van de pro-Koerdische partij BDP. Hij veroordeelde ook the de recente arrestaties en detenties van meer dan 2000 Koerdische politieke leiders en beloofde een onderzoek naar de vele onopgeloste moorden in de regio.

Maar de vraag blijft of de Koerden zich zullen laten verleiden door de verkiezingsbeloften van Kiliçdaroglu. In de laatste lokale verkiezingen haalde de BDP 99 gemeenten in de Koerdische provincies. In sommige symbolische plaatsen zoals Diyarbakir haalden ze meer dan 70% van de stemmen. Maar de BDP heeft het niet makkelijk om om te voldoen aan de vele noden van zijn achterban. Vlak na hun verkiezingsoverwinning werden meer dan 2000 partijkaders en middenveldleiders opgepakt en beschuldigt van lidmaatschap van de KCK, een platformgroep die ook de PKK omvat. Het 'KCK-proces' heeft de gemeenten en de partij sterk verzwakt. Als gevolg van het sterk gecentraliseerde Turkse politieke systeem hebben de gemeenten weinig politieke en financiële macht. Hun relatie met de centrale overheid, in de vorm van de provinciegouverneurs, blijft conflictueus.

De AKP beschuldigt de PKK en de BDP ervan onschuldige kinderen en jongeren te misbruiken in de gewelddadige protesten van de laatste maanden. Zo gaan ze voorbij aan het feit dat het – nog steeds voortdurende - gewapende conflict de Koerdische jongeren en hun familie sterk getroffen heeft. De grote steden werden enkele jaren geleden overspoeld met vluchtingen uit de dorpen, met een extreme stedelijke armoede als gevolg. De landelijke gebieden worden geterroriseerd door dorpswachters – paramilitairen bewapend en betaald door de overheid om de PKK te bestrijden – en landmijnen. Onderwijs in het Koerdisch blijft nog steeds een verre droom. Drie generaties dragen nu de littekens van de oorlog.

Partijpolitiek en verkiezingsretoriek zullen er niet in slagen om de dagelijkse problemen van de Turkse Koerden op te lossen. De situatie waarbij de AKP de Koerden laat vallen, de CHP hen enkel toespreekt tijdens verkiezingscampagnes en de BDP geen politieke ruimte krijgt voor zijn democratische eisen belooft een explosieve cocktail te worden na de verkiezingen van 12 juni.

Turkey's parliamentary elections and the Kurds: Big parties change roles, Kurdish representatives persecuted

With less than two weeks to go before the Turkish general elections, the election fever in the highly politicised country couldn't be higher. Especially in the southeast, the tensions have been increasing every day since February. Traditional days of protest have turned into full blown riots and the Turkish military has stepped up in their military actions against the PKK-rebels, occasionally crossing the Iraqi border and causing the deaths of more than 40 guerillas in the last months.

At the other side of Turkey the Kurdish Question is also on the election agenda. Interestingly, the two main political parties, Erdogan's ruling AK-Party and the social-democratic CHP have changed positions on how the Kurdish Question should be solved. AKP, who in the recent years have recognized the existence of Kurds and the Kurdish problem – a bold step in Turkey – and, under pressure of the EU, initiated a 'Democratic Opening' towards the Kurds, has in the recent weeks switched to a far more nationalist discourse. Prime Minister Erdogan even announced the Kurdish Question to be over, thus making the choice to appeal to the Turkish nationalist voters instead of the Kurdish votes. One can only wonder how Erdogan will account for this with the European Union, who expect Turkey to make some big changes regarding the Kurds if they want to join their club.

CHP on the other hand, with their Kemalist background, has reached out extensively to the Kurds in the last weeks. When 12 PKK-guerillas died as a result of clashes with the army, the CHP headquarters in Diyarbakir respected the three day period of mourning and closed their election offices 'out of respect for the will of the people'. At a recent visit to Hakkari, a province at the Iraqi border under heavy influence of PKK, CHP leader Kiliçdaroglu made three promises. Firstly, he spoke out in favor of more autonomy for municipalities according to the European model, an important demand of the pro-Kurdish party BDP. He also condemned the recent political arrests and detention of more than 2000 Kurdish political and community leaders and promised an investigation into the many unsolved murders in the region.

But the question remains wether the Kurds will fall for CHP's charms. In the latest local elections, the BDP took 99 municipalities in the Kurdish regions. In some symbolic places like Diyarbakir they managed to get more than 70% of the votes. Still the BDP has a hard time meeting the many needs of their constituence. Right after their electoral victory more than 2000 party leaders and civil society activists were taken to prison under accusations of membership of the KCK, a forbidden Kurdish platformgroup containing the PKK. The 'KCK-trial', as it is known, has weakened the municipalities and the party. In the extremely centralised Turkish political system, municipalities hold very little political and financial power. Their relations with the central government, in the form of the provinces governorships, remains conflictual, to say the least.

While the AKP accuses the PKK and BDP of using innocent youth and children to protest against the security forces, fact remains that the still ongoing conflict is heavily affecting the Kurdish youth and their families. The big cities are crowded with refugees who fled their villages during the height of the armed conflict, leading to very extreme urban poverty. In the rural area's, government armed village guards terrorise the villages and landmines still pose an everyday threat. Mothertongue education still remains a far away dream. Almost three generations of Kurds now carry the scars of the war.

High party politics will most likely not succeed in resolving the everyday problems of these people. The fact that some parties chose to ignore the Kurds, others only adress them during election time and democratically elected Kurds do not get the chance to build a legitimate political movement promises for a dangerous cocktail after the twelfth of June.

The ‘Kurdish opening’ in Turkey remains as open as ever. By Bashdar Ismaeel

The ‘Kurdish opening’ in Turkey remains as open as ever. By Bashdar Ismaeel

Turkey: Armed with stones, petrol bombs: Kurdish youth claim mission

Turkey: Armed with stones, petrol bombs: Kurdish youth claim mission

CHILDRENS RIGHTS IN TURKISH KURDISTAN: STATE OF PLAY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS AND INGO'S

Legal Framework

UN Conventions

Having ratified the CRC on 4 April 1995, the Turkish government has an obliga­tion to protect children living in Turkey, regardless of their ethnicity, religion, or sex. However, at the time of ratification Turkey stated that it reserved the right to interpret and apply the provisions of a number of articles of the CRC, ‘according to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey and those of the Treaty of Lausanne’, which constricts the officially recognised minorities in Turkey to non-muslims. The relevant articles are: Article 17, covering a child’s right to have access to information and materials from a diverse source of national and international mass media; Article 29, which provides for a child’s right to education that encourages cultural respect and diversity; and Article 30, which covers a child’s right to participate in his or her culture, language and religion.

After ratification, Turkey was required to submit an implementation report within two years. Upon receipt of this report in 1999, the working group of the Committee on the Rights of the Child requested further information on a number of specific concerns regard­ing the implementation of the CRC. Turkey was required to submit a second peri­odic report by 2 May 2002 and a third by 3 May 2007. However, it has yet to submit either of these reports.

On 8 June 2001, after reviewing reports from leading human rights NGOs and in­formation provided by the Turkish government, the Committee emphasised the following issues:

1) The potential negative impact of Turkey’s ‘reservations’ on the rights of children not recognised under the Treaty of Lausanne, particularly Kurdish children;

2) Discrepancies between the law and practice of legal review, particularly with regard to the pre-trial detention of children;

3) The need for Turkey to develop stronger programmes to ensure the economic and social protection of children in the most vulnerable circumstance, including those in south-eastern Turkey;

4) Regional and socio-economic disparities and their grave consequences on the devel­opment of children, particularly in the Southeast;

5) Concerns regarding the number of displaced Kurdish children and their lack of sub­stantial housing, health services and education;

6) The finding that a significant number of children working or living on the streets are mainly reliant on NGO assistance, with most not receiving government aid.

There are two additional protocols to the CRC. The first is entitled the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts. This was ratified by Turkey in June 2004. The second is the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, which was ratified by Turkey in 2002. Turkey is also party to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traficking Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime.

The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

Turkey ratified the ECHR in 1954, in addition to Protocol 1, which enshrines the right to protection of property, to education and to free elections. In 2004, Turkey ratified Protocol 13, which prohibits the death penalty in all circumstances, includ­ing in times or war and at times of danger of war. In October 2006, Turkey ratified Protocol No. 14, amending the control system of the ECHR.

Significantly, the majority of cases establishing violations of the ECHR and its Pro­tocols by the Turkish government have related to events in the Kurdish region of south-eastern Turkey.

The European Social Charter

The European Social Charter (ESC) was adopted to complement the ECHR. It provides further protection from discrimination and the protection of the social wellbeing of European citizens. This treaty in particular secures the protection of children’s rights.

Turkey ratified the ESC on 24 November 1989. On 26 June 2007 it ratified the Re­vised Social Charter, accepting 91 of its 98 paragraphs. However, Turkey has nei­ther signed nor ratified Protocol 3, which provides for a system of collective com­plaints.

Further, Turkey has not signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, or the European Charter for Regional or Mi­nority Languages.