Deze blogspot brengt het verslag van mijn verblijf in Zuid-Oost Turkije (Noord-Koerdistan) met als focus het aanslepende conflict en kinderrechten. Het richt zich tot iedereen die hierover meer wil te weten komen en in het bijzonder tot Europese beleidsmakers, kinderrechten - en vredesorganisaties die binnen het Turkse toetredingsproces aandacht willen vragen voor een vreedzame en dus kindvriendelijke oplossing van de Koerdische kwestie. Sommige posts zullen vertaald worden naar het Engels en het Frans.

This blogspot reports on my stay in the Southeast of Turkey (North-Kurdistan) and focusses on the ongoing conflict and childrens rights. It was set up for everybody who wants to know more about the subject. In particular, it aims to adress European policy makers, childrens rights and peace organisations who want to work on a peacefull and child friendly solution for the Kurdish question within the framework of the Turkish accession process to the EU. Some of the posts will be translated into English and French.

vrijdag 3 juni 2011

Turkse parlementaire verkiezingen en de Koerden: grote partijen wisselen van positie, Koerdische leiders vervolgd

Met minder dan twee weken te gaan voor de parlementaire verkiezingen is de sfeer te snijden in Turkije. De verkiezingskoorts loopt hoog op, vooral in de oostelijke Koerdische gebieden. Sinds februari al lopen politieke protesten steevast uit op grootscheepse gevechten tussen de politie, het leger en pro-Koerdische sympathisanten. Het Turkse leger voerde zijn militaire acties tegen de Koerdische PKK - rebellen op met de dood van meer dan 40 PKK-guerillas als gevolg.

Aan de andere kant van Turkije staat de Koerdische kwestie ook op de verkiezingsagenda. De twee grootste politieke partijen, de AKP van de huidige Eerste Minister Erdogan en de CHP, de sociaal-democratische oppositiepartij, zijn van positie veranderd wat betreft de toekomst van de Koerden. De AKP, die de afgelopen jaren onder druk van de Europese Unie het bestaan van de Koerden en de Koerdische kwestie heeft toegegeven – een historische stap voor Turkije – schakelde in de laatste weken over naar een sterk nationalistisch discours. Premier Erdogan verklaarde in één van zijn verkiezingsrally's zelfs dat de Koerdische kwestie niet langer bestond. Op die manier maakte hij duidelijk dat hij deze verkiezingen niet langer naar de hand van de Koerden dingt, maar naar die van de Turks-nationalisten. De MHP, traditioneel de partij van de extreem-nationalisten, speelt immers een sleutelrol in deze verkiezingen. Als de MHP de kiesdrempel van 10% niet haalt, heeft de AKP naar alle waarschijnlijkheid de meerderheid in het parlement en vrij spel om de grondwet te veranderen.

De CHP aan de andere kant, met zijn Kemalistische achtergrond, steekt in zijn verkiezingsdiscours dit keer duidelijk de hand uit naar de Koerdische kiezers. Toen 12 PKK-guerillas sneuvelden in een gevecht met het leger, respecteerde het CHP-hoofdkwartier in Diyarbakir, de grootste stad van het zuidoosten, de rouwperiode die werd afgekondigd door de pro-Koerdische beweging en sloot hun verkiezingsbureau 'uit respect voor de wil van het volk'. Tijdens een bezoek aan Hakkari, een Koerdische provincie aan de grens met Irak die onder sterke invloed is van de PKK, maakte CHP-leider Kilicdaroglu drie beloften. Ten eerste sprak hij zich uit voor meer autonomie voor de gemeenten naar voorbeeld van het Europese model, een belangrijke eis van de pro-Koerdische partij BDP. Hij veroordeelde ook the de recente arrestaties en detenties van meer dan 2000 Koerdische politieke leiders en beloofde een onderzoek naar de vele onopgeloste moorden in de regio.

Maar de vraag blijft of de Koerden zich zullen laten verleiden door de verkiezingsbeloften van Kiliçdaroglu. In de laatste lokale verkiezingen haalde de BDP 99 gemeenten in de Koerdische provincies. In sommige symbolische plaatsen zoals Diyarbakir haalden ze meer dan 70% van de stemmen. Maar de BDP heeft het niet makkelijk om om te voldoen aan de vele noden van zijn achterban. Vlak na hun verkiezingsoverwinning werden meer dan 2000 partijkaders en middenveldleiders opgepakt en beschuldigt van lidmaatschap van de KCK, een platformgroep die ook de PKK omvat. Het 'KCK-proces' heeft de gemeenten en de partij sterk verzwakt. Als gevolg van het sterk gecentraliseerde Turkse politieke systeem hebben de gemeenten weinig politieke en financiële macht. Hun relatie met de centrale overheid, in de vorm van de provinciegouverneurs, blijft conflictueus.

De AKP beschuldigt de PKK en de BDP ervan onschuldige kinderen en jongeren te misbruiken in de gewelddadige protesten van de laatste maanden. Zo gaan ze voorbij aan het feit dat het – nog steeds voortdurende - gewapende conflict de Koerdische jongeren en hun familie sterk getroffen heeft. De grote steden werden enkele jaren geleden overspoeld met vluchtingen uit de dorpen, met een extreme stedelijke armoede als gevolg. De landelijke gebieden worden geterroriseerd door dorpswachters – paramilitairen bewapend en betaald door de overheid om de PKK te bestrijden – en landmijnen. Onderwijs in het Koerdisch blijft nog steeds een verre droom. Drie generaties dragen nu de littekens van de oorlog.

Partijpolitiek en verkiezingsretoriek zullen er niet in slagen om de dagelijkse problemen van de Turkse Koerden op te lossen. De situatie waarbij de AKP de Koerden laat vallen, de CHP hen enkel toespreekt tijdens verkiezingscampagnes en de BDP geen politieke ruimte krijgt voor zijn democratische eisen belooft een explosieve cocktail te worden na de verkiezingen van 12 juni.

donderdag 2 juni 2011

Turkey's parliamentary elections and the Kurds: Big parties change roles, Kurdish representatives persecuted

With less than two weeks to go before the Turkish general elections, the election fever in the highly politicised country couldn't be higher. Especially in the southeast, the tensions have been increasing every day since February. Traditional days of protest have turned into full blown riots and the Turkish military has stepped up in their military actions against the PKK-rebels, occasionally crossing the Iraqi border and causing the deaths of more than 40 guerillas in the last months.

At the other side of Turkey the Kurdish Question is also on the election agenda. Interestingly, the two main political parties, Erdogan's ruling AK-Party and the social-democratic CHP have changed positions on how the Kurdish Question should be solved. AKP, who in the recent years have recognized the existence of Kurds and the Kurdish problem – a bold step in Turkey – and, under pressure of the EU, initiated a 'Democratic Opening' towards the Kurds, has in the recent weeks switched to a far more nationalist discourse. Prime Minister Erdogan even announced the Kurdish Question to be over, thus making the choice to appeal to the Turkish nationalist voters instead of the Kurdish votes. One can only wonder how Erdogan will account for this with the European Union, who expect Turkey to make some big changes regarding the Kurds if they want to join their club.

CHP on the other hand, with their Kemalist background, has reached out extensively to the Kurds in the last weeks. When 12 PKK-guerillas died as a result of clashes with the army, the CHP headquarters in Diyarbakir respected the three day period of mourning and closed their election offices 'out of respect for the will of the people'. At a recent visit to Hakkari, a province at the Iraqi border under heavy influence of PKK, CHP leader Kiliçdaroglu made three promises. Firstly, he spoke out in favor of more autonomy for municipalities according to the European model, an important demand of the pro-Kurdish party BDP. He also condemned the recent political arrests and detention of more than 2000 Kurdish political and community leaders and promised an investigation into the many unsolved murders in the region.

But the question remains wether the Kurds will fall for CHP's charms. In the latest local elections, the BDP took 99 municipalities in the Kurdish regions. In some symbolic places like Diyarbakir they managed to get more than 70% of the votes. Still the BDP has a hard time meeting the many needs of their constituence. Right after their electoral victory more than 2000 party leaders and civil society activists were taken to prison under accusations of membership of the KCK, a forbidden Kurdish platformgroup containing the PKK. The 'KCK-trial', as it is known, has weakened the municipalities and the party. In the extremely centralised Turkish political system, municipalities hold very little political and financial power. Their relations with the central government, in the form of the provinces governorships, remains conflictual, to say the least.

While the AKP accuses the PKK and BDP of using innocent youth and children to protest against the security forces, fact remains that the still ongoing conflict is heavily affecting the Kurdish youth and their families. The big cities are crowded with refugees who fled their villages during the height of the armed conflict, leading to very extreme urban poverty. In the rural area's, government armed village guards terrorise the villages and landmines still pose an everyday threat. Mothertongue education still remains a far away dream. Almost three generations of Kurds now carry the scars of the war.

High party politics will most likely not succeed in resolving the everyday problems of these people. The fact that some parties chose to ignore the Kurds, others only adress them during election time and democratically elected Kurds do not get the chance to build a legitimate political movement promises for a dangerous cocktail after the twelfth of June.

dinsdag 17 mei 2011

CHILDRENS RIGHTS IN TURKISH KURDISTAN: STATE OF PLAY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS AND INGO'S

Legal Framework

UN Conventions

Having ratified the CRC on 4 April 1995, the Turkish government has an obliga­tion to protect children living in Turkey, regardless of their ethnicity, religion, or sex. However, at the time of ratification Turkey stated that it reserved the right to interpret and apply the provisions of a number of articles of the CRC, ‘according to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey and those of the Treaty of Lausanne’, which constricts the officially recognised minorities in Turkey to non-muslims. The relevant articles are: Article 17, covering a child’s right to have access to information and materials from a diverse source of national and international mass media; Article 29, which provides for a child’s right to education that encourages cultural respect and diversity; and Article 30, which covers a child’s right to participate in his or her culture, language and religion.

After ratification, Turkey was required to submit an implementation report within two years. Upon receipt of this report in 1999, the working group of the Committee on the Rights of the Child requested further information on a number of specific concerns regard­ing the implementation of the CRC. Turkey was required to submit a second peri­odic report by 2 May 2002 and a third by 3 May 2007. However, it has yet to submit either of these reports.

On 8 June 2001, after reviewing reports from leading human rights NGOs and in­formation provided by the Turkish government, the Committee emphasised the following issues:
1) The potential negative impact of Turkey’s ‘reservations’ on the rights of children not recognised under the Treaty of Lausanne, particularly Kurdish children;
2) Discrepancies between the law and practice of legal review, particularly with regard to the pre-trial detention of children;
3) The need for Turkey to develop stronger programmes to ensure the economic and social protection of children in the most vulnerable circumstance, including those in south-eastern Turkey;
4) Regional and socio-economic disparities and their grave consequences on the devel­opment of children, particularly in the Southeast;
5) Concerns regarding the number of displaced Kurdish children and their lack of sub­stantial housing, health services and education;
6) The finding that a significant number of children working or living on the streets are mainly reliant on NGO assistance, with most not receiving government aid.

There are two additional protocols to the CRC. The first is entitled the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts. This was ratified by Turkey in June 2004. The second is the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, which was ratified by Turkey in 2002. Turkey is also party to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traficking Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime.
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Turkey ratified the ECHR in 1954, in addition to Protocol 1, which enshrines the right to protection of property, to education and to free elections. In 2004, Turkey ratified Protocol 13, which prohibits the death penalty in all circumstances, includ­ing in times or war and at times of danger of war. In October 2006, Turkey ratified Protocol No. 14, amending the control system of the ECHR.
Significantly, the majority of cases establishing violations of the ECHR and its Pro­tocols by the Turkish government have related to events in the Kurdish region of south-eastern Turkey.
The European Social Charter
The European Social Charter (ESC) was adopted to complement the ECHR. It provides further protection from discrimination and the protection of the social wellbeing of European citizens. This treaty in particular secures the protection of children’s rights.
Turkey ratified the ESC on 24 November 1989. On 26 June 2007 it ratified the Re­vised Social Charter, accepting 91 of its 98 paragraphs. However, Turkey has nei­ther signed nor ratified Protocol 3, which provides for a system of collective com­plaints.
Further, Turkey has not signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, or the European Charter for Regional or Mi­nority Languages.

"Mother Tongue First" is published

Diyarbakir Institute for Political and Social Research (DİSA) continue its researches and studies on the Use of Mother Tongue in Education. In this respect, the program named Advocacy for Mother Tongue in Education has been prepared to ensure the Use of Kurdish as Mother Tongue in Education. For this aim, a series of multilingual brochures named Mother Tongue First will be published to raise the public awareness and to enrich the current discussions based on sound data. The first of these bilingual brochures has already been published in Kurdish and Turkish sharing the same name with the series Mother Tongue First. Within this first brochure, topics such as the importance of the use of mother tongue in education, the relationship between mother tongue-based education and gender, revolutionary education, language policies and practices, linguistic interdependence, economic aspects of bilingual education and linguistic biodiversity have been covered through the abridged articles by worldwide known experts. We are happy to share this work of us with you. Click here.

HOU DE KOERDEN ARM! - ONTWIKKELINGSPOLITIEK IN TURKS KOERDISTAN

Nina Henkens - mei 2011

De Koerden genieten weinig faam, en als er al over hen gesproken wordt is het meestal in weinig flatterende termen zoals 'terroristen of 'separatisten'. Maar er is meer aan de hand. De Koerdische regio is chronisch onderontwikkeld. Het gewapende conflict dat de laatste jaren sterk in intensiteit is afgenomen heeft desastreuze gevolgen voor de welvaart in het oosten van Turkije. Ook internationale, neoliberale hervormingen waren niet bevordelijk voor duurzame ontwikkeling. De pogingen van de Turkse regering om te investeren in de regio over de hoofden van de bevolking heen hebben weinig of geen resultaat.  

THE KURDISH ISSUE IN TURKEY: THE RIGHT TO EXIST IS NOT ENOUGH

By Nurcan Baysal, Dilan Bozgan and Nina Henkens

Submitted to the Prague Security Institute on the occasion of the conference 'Where is Turkey heading?', May 4 2011

Introduction
For the last few years there has been a general feeling of losing momentum and general ignorance of the Kurdish people and their problems. There are a few different perspectives to the Kurdish question in Turkey. For some it is an underdevelopment and economic problem, for most it is an identity problem. The authors argue that there is a need to consider both of them together, not separately. They also argue that the inability to openly discuss the main causes of the problems for Kurdish people, which is the armed conflict in the southeast, is hindering development and the peace process in a very important way.
The report will not consist of a theoretically based political analyses but will adress the everyday difficulties for people living in the Kurdish regions, which the authors consider to be the biggest obstacles for a durable peaceful solution of the conflict. The authors would like to thank the Prague Security Institute and the Heinrich Boll Stiftung for making the conference possible and inviting us to contribute our ideas and letting us participate in the valuable discussion on where Turkey is heading. 

donderdag 28 april 2011

Nurcan Baysal: BEING A CHILD ON THE EAST SIDE OF FIRAT

Nurcan Baysal: BEING A CHILD ON THE EAST SIDE OF FIRAT: "As published in Birikim magazine, number 254, 2010 On the 1st of February, the story of Asliye and Zeynep who died on the r..."

Nurcan Baysal: DIYARBAKIR TODAY

Nurcan Baysal: DIYARBAKIR TODAY: "As published in Radikal 2 newspaper on 03/01/2010 Two days left till 2010. Diyarbakır ’s very sad today. I worked at the office till noon, ..."

woensdag 9 februari 2011

Rehabilitation project for Kurdish children released from prison


( 26/01/2011)

Just this summer, the detention of Kurdish children as a result of the Turkish Anti-Terror Legislation (Terorle Mucadele Kanunu TMK), got a lot of attention in Turkey and beyond. In certain cases, more specific in pro-Kurdish protests that are automatically being categorised as terrorism, that legislation made it possible to persecute minors like adults.
This is how thousands of children ended up in adult prisons and sometimes got sentences of many years because for throwing rocks at policemen or shouting slogans in favour of PKK, the (forbidden) Kurdish Workers Party.
Because of continuous public attention and the campaigns of human rights organisations, the TMK got adjusted through the Parliament.

Because of these changes, the conviction of minors within the scope of TMK should all be nullified. The children who are being persecuted within the scope of other laws now have to be judged in juvenile courts and no longer in the Special Courts for Serious Crimes. Despite this step forward, still a lot of children have not been released because the assignment of the dossiers to the juvenile courts is moving slowly. In certain (Eastern) provinces there is a lack of juvenile courts.

Now that the journalists have left, the problem is still not over and done with. The children who have been released from prison – and their families – are in need of guidance and rehabilitation. Besides, the only true answer to the problem is an enduring solution to the conflict in the Southeast.

Doctor Necdet Ipekyüz is the head of the department of the Turkish Human Rights Foundation in Diyarbakir, the unofficial capital of North-Kurdistan. Since 1990, the organization has devoted itself to the rehabilitation and relief of victims of torture and the monitoring of torturing practices. When the massive detention of minors started and the negative effects on the children became clear, the THRF took the initiative together with local NGOs and trade unions to assure the relief and rehabilitation for these young people.

" We
already knew at the beginning of the project that we were dealing with a true war generation They are the children of Kurdish refugees who had to leave their villages and rebuild a new life in the cities. They have lost their families in fights or saw them going to the mountains (to join the PKK-rebels). A lot of their family members and friends are or were in prison. The children carry their parents' traumas with them."

The traumatizing effects of the conflict not only restrict themselves to the Kurdish side. “Because of the obligated army service, a lot of young Turks end up in very violent situations here.
Although they are being welcomed back as heroes, we know that amongst the conscripts a lot of suicides occur and that they show a lot of violent behaviour within their families. But this subject is still under a taboo and has not yet been investigated.”
Doctor Ipekyüz makes an urgent call to organizations and individuals who could assist him with expertise in trauma recovery.

“The first thing we did at the beginning of the project was to assess the needs of the children. We noticed that it was very important to also work intensively with the parents and the families. It is crucial that hey are well-informed about the legal situation of the children. For example, when the TMK was adjusted in the parliament, some parents thought that throwing rocks at the police was no longer punishable.”


Clearly Ipekyüz chooses a realistic and down to earth approach to the problem.” Not all children have psychological problems as a result of their detention, or at least not immediately. The period after the release is often one of relief, spoilement and appraisements by the family. Sometimes the
problems come only a while after that. Some children are being treated as heroes when they leave prison, some as terrorists. They are none of both. But also not all of them are helpless victims. The complex reality of the Kurdish territories makes it impossible to generalize. The problems are different in every city or region and every child reacts in his or hers own way. There are children who stay angry but also children who would love to  study and become a lawyer. Others isolate themselves and fall into passive behavior.”

In 2010 Ipekyüz, together with his team, could treat 25 children (of which 5 girls) and their families with positive results. The children go in for treatment with psychologists and doctors if necessary and the families are being observed by a social worker and jurists. They contact the school and search for opportunities for continuing studies or job possibilities.

Aside from the individual guidance, the organization carefully keeps up with all the information about the number of children in detention and the circumstances of their imprisonment. Ipekyüz hopes that the interest in the problems of the children will not disappear completely.” The young people are angry and they want to get back on the agenda.”

When asked what exactly his project needs to succeed, Ipekyüz is very clear: “Baris, peace!”



dinsdag 1 februari 2011

Diyarbakir, stad van oude beschavingen en verse wonden



In Diyarbakir, de onofficiële Koerdische hoofdstad in het zuidoosten van Turkije, is de rust de
laatste jaren weergekeerd, mede als gevolg van Europese druk. Maar de bevolking draagt de
wonden van het conflict nog steeds mee en de voorwaarden voor een duurzame vrede zijn nog
steeds niet vervuld.

Diyarbakir, Amed in het Koerdisch, zou al in 2000 voor Christus bestaan hebben en verschillende
beschavingen lieten er hun sporen achter. De zes kilometer lange muren die het oude
stadscentrum omringen dragen sporen van de Hittieten, Perzen, Romeinen en Byzantijnen.

De stad is de laatste 20 jaar het symbolische middelpunt van de strijd tussen de Turkse staat en de
Koerdische rebellenbeweging PKK en zijn aanhangers. In het nieuwe gedeelte van de stad, buiten
de stadsmuren, bevinden zich op verschillende plaatsen militaire zones waar het Turkse leger
gestationeerd is. De directe aanwezigheid van soldaten is een dagelijkse realiteit voor de inwoners
van Diyarbakir.

De gevangenis van Diyarbakir staat bekend als één van de wreedste gevangenissen in de wereld en
tijdens de jaren '80 en '90 stierven tientallen gevangenen, waaronder veel PKK-leden, in de
gevangenis als gevolg van folteringen.

Het historische stadscentrum, Suriçi (letterlijk 'binnen de muren') wordt hoofdzakelijk bevolkt door
Koerden die afkomstig zijn van het platteland. Daar vernieldde het Turkse leger tijdens de
oorlogsjaren duizenden dorpen om de solidariteit met de PKK te breken.

Sinds 2000 is de situatie minder gespannen, mede dankzij druk van de Europese Unie. Ook de PKK
heeft na de arrestatie en gevangenhouding van hun leider Abdullah Öcalan zijn eis voor een
onafhankelijk Koerdistan laten vallen. Ze zetten nu vooral in op het verkrijgen van politieke en
culturele rechten voor de Koerden en andere minderheden (Alevi's, Armenen, ...) volgens een
model van democratische autonomie. De pro-Koerdische partij die deze gedachte mee uitdraagt, de BDP ( Vrede en Democratie Partij) haalt in de steden van het zuidoosten tot(mag weg) meer dan 60% van de stemmen.

Maar de herinneringen aan oppressie en geweld liggen nog vers in het geheugen van de inwoners.
Mahmut, 25, herinnert zich nog levendig hoe hij de eerste keer in Diyarbakir verzeilde. “ Toen ik
acht was, was ik met vrienden in de buurt van de legerbasis in ons dorp aan het spelen. Plots
vielen drie waakhonden van het leger me aan. Twee dagen later werd ik wakker in het ziekenhuis
van Diyarbakir.”

Een paar jaar later moest Mahmut definitief naar de stad verhuizen toen zijn
vader, een rijke man in het dorp, door het leger gevraagd werd om dorpswachter te worden.
Dorpswachters worden bewapend door het leger om de PKK te bevechten en informatie door te
spelen. Weigeren was geen optie, dus vluchtte Mahmut met zijn ouders naar Diyarbakir. Toen het
spaargeld op was moest Mahmut gaan werken om mee in het onderhoud van zijn familie te
voorzien. Hij heeft nog steeds problemen met de gewrichten in zijn heup en stapt moeilijk.
Mahmut is niet alleen. Tijdens een wandeling door de stad wordt duidelijk dat een hoog
percentage van de bevolking lichamelijk letsel heeft overgehouden aan de oorlog.

Cengiz Toprak, een jonge Koerdische filmregisseur, is in Diyarbakir om een documentaire te maken
over de woelige jaren '90. “In 1988 riep het leger hier noodmaatregelen afgeroepen af.
Diyarbakir was bezet gebied en op straat klonken schoten. Als kind was het een heel
beangstigende periode, we wisten nooit of onze vaders 's avonds wel thuis zouden komen. Ik wil
weten wat er gebeurd is met de generatie die onder die omstandigheden moest opgroeien en
vastleggen wat er toen gebeurde.”

In 2002 werden de maatregelen opgeheven. Maar van tijd tot tijd wordt Diyarbakir opnieuw
opgeschrikt door onlusten, bijvoorbeeld wanneer de Koerdische bevolking belet wordt culturele
feesten te organiseren of voor de zoveelste keer democratisch verkozen politici in de gevangenis
belanden.

De wonden beperken zich niet tot de Koerdische zijde. Volgens Necdet Ipekyuz, arts en hoofd van de Turkish Human Rights Foundation in Diyarbakir, zijn ook veel van de Turkse soldaten die gestationeerd zijn in het zuidoosten getraumatiseerd door wat ze meemaken.
Ipekyuz: “Ze worden thuis onthaald als helden, maar we weten dat er onder ex-dienstplichtigen
veel zelfdoding en intrafamiliaal geweld voorkomt. Jammer genoeg is dit fenomeen in Turkije nog
steeds taboe en werd het nog niet bestudeerd.”

zondag 30 januari 2011

The Language Wound

The Language Wound: The use of the mother tongue in education and experiences of Kurdish students", a study from the Political and Social Research Institute of Diyarybakır, suggests bilingual and multi-lingual education models and courses to support the literacy of Kurdish-speaking parents.

(source: Bianet)


 "The Kurdish people are cut off from their right to use their mother tongue in education. This renders the protection and development of the ever dwindling Kurdish language impossible. At the same time, children with Kurdish as their mother tongue are disadvantaged in education and their success at school is influenced negatively. Moreover, social peace is being harmed". This is a summary of the reasons put forward by Dr Necdet İpekyüz, President of the Political and Social Research Institute of Diyarybakır (DİSA) for his research project entitled "The Language Wound: The use of the mother tongue in education and experiences of Kurdish students".

The research was presented in a meeting in Diyarbakır in the pre-dominantly Kurdish region of south-eastern Turkey last weekend. The workshop was lead by Şemsa Özar as the President of the Initiative for Women's Labour and Employment (KEİG) and organized by Assist. Prof. Vahap Coşkun from Dicle University (Diyarbakır), M. Şerif Derince from Sabancı University (Istanbul) and Assoc. Prof. Nesrin Uçaralar from Yeditepe University (Ist.). The study comprises five different sections under the headings "Nation-State, education and language", "The Turkish nation-state, education and language", "Mother tongue in education and experiences of Kurdish students", "Evaluation of field research findings and theoretical discussion" and "The right to education in the mother tongue - examples from other countries".


Problems revealed by personal stories

 The study leans on education models from Corsican/France, the Basque language in Spain and the Uighur language in China to reveal similarities and differences. Recommendations The research project eventually emphasizes that the problem has to be tackled by the public, the state and non-governmental organizations. The report contains several suggestions to students, teachers and parents. Kurdish has to be used in education; this should include models for teacher training regarding bilingual and multi-lingual education. Courses should be provided for students and parents who know Kurdish on literacy in the language. The social and cultural recommendations furthermore focus on the use of the mother tongue in education, raising awareness for the right to bilingualism, broadcasting television productions that help students developing their Kurdish language skills and acquainting people with the necessity and the beauty of different dialects. (NM/EÖ/VK)
"I was introduced to the Turkish language at primary school for the first time. I thought that the whole world would probably speak Kurdish. I had no idea about the existence of different languages" (Ahmet). "We just looked at our teacher. I tried to ask something but I did not manage. I had a friend and asked her to translate for me. Then I was able to ask when there was something I did not understand" (Rojhat). The project tells the story of 43 people from Diyarbakır, Ankara and Istanbul. Those were "Students starting school with Kurdish", "Teachers who know and do not know Kurdish" and "Parents who do not know Turkish". The main problems that emerged from the personal stories were lack of communication, starting with a handicap, failing class and dropping out of school, stigmatization, violence, waiting silently for the end of lesson, whistle-blowing, distinction between the city centre, suburbs and rural areas, the role of parents and displacement of language.
Children start school and learn Turkish as well as how to write and read.The teacher teaches both Turkish and how to read and write.  The teacher knows Kurdish but speaking the language is forbidden.  The parents only know Kurdish, they cannot communicate with the teacher. For the Kurdish people, this is called "Kula ziman", the "language wound".

dinsdag 25 januari 2011

Ingnoring Rights in Turkey, and Its Cost to Everyone

by Emma Sinclair-Webb (Human Rights Watch)

November 21, 2010
 
The European Commission's latest annual report of  Turkey's progress toward EU membership made one thing very clear: Turkey is not doing enough to improve its  human rights record.
Turkey has been focusing its energy on developing a dynamic foreign policy and promoting its  impressive economic growth.  The EU, for its part, has shown calculated indifference to Turkey's progress. But its attitude has little to do with rights abuse and everything to do with the political impasse over Cyprus and open hostility from Germany and France to Turkey ever becoming an EU member.   
The commission, in the report released last week, did seek out signs of progress - notably the package of constitutional amendments approved in the September 12 referendum. But the report generally followed up acknowledgement of any progress on human rights with the proviso that reforms made had been "of limited scope". The commission also noted what it characterized as the "confrontational political climate" in Turkey and the slowdown in its reform agenda over several years. 

Mostly the report offered a sombre reflection on all the areas where progress was lacking and on worrying trends.  Among these were the huge number of prosecutions of journalists;  disproportionate use of force by the police and their lack of accountability, given the huge backlog of ongoing judicial proceedings and  lengthy pre-trial detention and the fact that over half Turkey's prison population are remand prisoners--including children.
The report also highlighted the "major challenges" of gender equality and combating violence against women, and the government's "restrictive" approach to minority rights issues, including lack of progress in solving the Kurdish issue, and widespread use of anti-terror laws against Kurds.
At the news conference to release  the report, the European commissioner for enlargement and neighbourhood policy, Štefan Füle, expressed the concern that Turkey's accession process was "losing its momentum", and laid the blame on Turkey.

But if Turkey has been losing its momentum, so too has the EU. The EU member states that reneged on the commitment to keep Turkey on an accession track by repeatedly expressing their hostility to Turkey's possible EU membership must also bear responsibility for Turkey's coolness to being told to improve its record.  And both sides have found it convenient to hide behind the Cyprus issue, which continues to stall negotiations across a range of areas needed for EU membership.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in one interview, expressed frustration that in the face of its economic and foreign policy achievements Turkey had been kept waiting at the EU's door for so many years. In another he sent the message that the EU had more to gain from Turkey than Turkey did itself. President Abdullah Gül too indicated that the EU just hadn't offered Turkey enough.
 Their comments underscore an oscillation between feeling slighted by the EU and feeling incredulous at their sense that  the EU has failed to understand Turkey's growing importance as a significant foreign policy actor, respected by its neighbours west and east. 

So, what is the way forward?
Turkey's aim to be a constructive foreign policy actor would be greatly reinforced by bold   domestic reform, to strengthen and uphold the human rights of all its citizens, to solve the Kurdish issue, and to create a tolerant and rights-respecting society. Such moves on the domestic front can only increase Turkey's credibility on the international stage over the long term, and the citizens of Turkey deserve no less.
Hostile EU member states should for their part reassert a commitment to the accession negotiations.  History has repeatedly shown that the real prospect of EU membership has transformative power. 
Some in the EU understand what is at stake. Commissioner Füle noted last week: "By acting together, the EU and Turkey can strengthen energy security, address regional conflicts, and prevent cleavages developing along ethnic or religious lines."

Füle's remarks are a reminder that a Turkey that respects human rights and the rule of law is in everyone's interest. To continue with the reforms, to provide just implementation of those reforms in line with the Copenhagen political criteria and to remain committed to the accession process remains the best way to secure that outcome

zondag 23 januari 2011

Demonstrating Children still Facing Prison Sentences

Lawyer and rights defender Akço draws attention to the persisting problem of children on trial even after their release from prison due to a legal amendment in 2010. Akço demands an amendment of Article 31 of the TCK to solve the situation.

Istanbul - BİA News Center
20 January 2011, Thursday 
 
The children who are being tried under the Anti-Terror Law (TMY) because they attended demonstrations have been pushed aside from the agenda after certain legal amendments and after the campaigns of rights advocators have finished. However, lawyer Seda Akço, working in the field of children rights for many years, thinks that the problem is still going on and that it will even grow further if the justice system for children will not be reformed.
Due to legal amendments enforced in July 2010, children are not prosecuted under the same conditions as adults as it had been practices between 2006 and 2010. At the same time, the Court of Appeals took an important decision regariding a person who attended a demonstration upon the call of an illegal organization without actually being a member of the organization shall be punished like a member of an illegal organization.
According to Akço, the basic problem still persists, which is the question "whether to punish the children for their reactions". She emphasized, "The crucial point is to provide opportunities for the children to express their reactions. Otherwise, students participating in a canteen boycott and issuing a press release are punished as well - of course the severity of the penalty is important, too".

Children are not dangerous but in danger

So how should children who go to the streets to show their reactions be approached?
Akço highlighted that the police that are confronted with the demonstrators first should accept the fact that they can demonstrate and also the idea that children might be among them. Demonstrations are being made illegal. If violence is involved - including children - the police has to consider the children as "being in danger" and they have to act for their protection. They need a plan to take them out of the scene so they do not get harmed.
If they have to be taken into custody, this should not happen at the place of the incident but as far as possible upon request. It is not the duty of the police but of the prosecutor to determine who is guilty or suspicious. If the prosecutor decides to launch an investigation, priority should be given to avoid a restriction of the children's freedom. If there is a possibility for judiciary control, this should be preferred to detention. If a trial is launched, priority should be given to freedom of expression and punishment should only be considered as a last resort.
Akço argued, "I think that all children are facing common problems once an event has entered the field of crime. Children are being discriminated because they are Kurds but this is not specific to them, Romans and homosexuals are being discriminated as well, for instance".

"Article 31 of the TCK has to be amended"

In Akço's opinion, the actual problem is to allocate resources to fulfil the legal obligations of the many applications and administrative regulations.
A pressing problem is Article 31 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) (Minor Status). Akço criticized that judges have no other option but punishment for children who are aware of the legal significance and consequences of the offence.
In fact, the reason that drove the child to the commitment of an offence should be determined and precautionary applications should be imposed to remove that reason. Only if this is considered to be inefficient, the court should decree for punishment.
"If a child commits a theft because he is hungry, it should be prevented from staying hungry. Looking at it from a specific angle, a solution for the children who attend demonstrations would also be a solution of the Kurdish question".
The lawyer stressed that the judiciary will try to find their own solutions as long as the government does not take according steps. Due to a lack of alternatives, this solution means punishing the children, Akço emphasized.

"I don't trust the amendment"

Akço furthermore indicated that the attitude of the police could be changed with an according approach of the administration.
"The release of children in detention was a relief, but we will see what is going to happen once the courts will establish their verdicts. (...) If the Prime Minister will make an announcement similar to the one in 2006 [What needs to be done will be done for women as well as children], detention houses will again be filled up with children. Therefore, I do not trust the amendment". (EÜ/VK)